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We consider a two period model of optimal regulation of a ﬁrm subject to marginal compli-
ance cost shocks. The regulator faces an asymmetric information problem: the ﬁrm knows
current compliance costs, but the regulator does not. Both the regulator and the ﬁrm are un-
certain about future costs. In our basic framework, the regulator may not oﬀer payments to
the ﬁrm; we show that the regulator can vary the strength of regulation over time to induce
the ﬁrm to reveal its costs and increase welfare. In the optimal mechanism, the regulator
oﬀers stronger (weaker) regulation in the ﬁrst period and weaker (stronger) regulation in the
second period if the ﬁrm reports low (high) compliance costs in the ﬁrst period. Low cost
ﬁrms expect compliance costs to rise in the future, and thus prefer weaker regulation in the
second period. High cost ﬁrms expect costs to fall in the future and thus prefer regulation
which becomes more strict over time. Thus the regulator oﬀers the low (high) cost ﬁrms
slightly weaker (stronger) regulation in the second period in exchange for much stronger
(weaker) regulation in the ﬁrst period, thereby “timing” the regulation. If the regulator can
make payments, then the optimal mechanism to some degree times the regulation as long as
a positive cost of funds exists. If the cost of funds is high enough, then under the optimal
mechanism the regulator will not use payments and use our timing mechanism exclusively.1 Introduction
We consider a two period model of optimal regulation of a ﬁrm subject to marginal compli-
ance cost shocks. The regulator faces an asymmetric information problem: the ﬁrm knows
the current compliance cost, but the regulator does not. Both the regulator and the ﬁrm
are uncertain about future compliance costs. Standard economic theory suggests making
payments or rebates conditional on the beneﬁts or costs of regulation. Frequently, however,
regulators are prohibited or otherwise unable to make monetary payments to ﬁrms. Regula-
tors do typically have considerable latitude on how regulations are implemented: regulators
may interpret vague statutes weakly or strictly, grant waivers to delay implementation of the
regulation, shape future legislation so that regulations become more strict or weak, and/or
vary enforcement. We show that the regulator can vary the strength of regulation so as to
induce the ﬁrm to reveal the cost of compliance and increase welfare.
In particular, in the optimal mechanism the regulator oﬀers stronger regulation in the
current period and weaker regulation in the future if a ﬁrm reports low compliance costs in
the current period. Conversely, ﬁrms reporting high costs receive regulation that becomes
more strict over time. We refer to our mechanism as “timing” the regulation. At ﬁrst
glance, timing the regulation may seem counterintuitive. Since compliance costs are convex,
a policy that strengthens regulation in the current period and weakens regulation in the
next period by an equal amount is more costly than an average level of regulation in both
periods. However, the regulator need only oﬀer ﬁrms reporting low costs today slightly
weaker regulation in the future in exchange for much stronger regulation today to induce
the low cost ﬁrms to reveal their type. This is because a ﬁrm that receives a below average
compliance cost shock in the current period expects higher costs in the future. Thus, low
cost ﬁrms prefer to be regulated lightly in the future, and so the regulator need only oﬀer
slightly weaker future regulation to induce low cost ﬁrms to reveal their type. Similarly,
ﬁrms receiving a higher than average cost shock expect costs to fall over time, and thus
prefer regulation that is initially weaker. As will be clear in the paper, timing the regulation
not only improves welfare by making regulation stronger when compliance costs are low, but
also improves welfare by inducing ﬁrms to reveal cost shocks.
A large literature exists which develops mechanisms that induce ﬁrms to reveal compli-
ance cost shocks and raise welfare. Standard economic theory (see for example, Roberts
and Spence 1976, Kwerel 1977) suggests the ﬁrst best (full information) level of regulation
may be achieved in competitive environments via hybrid tax/subsidy or permit/subsidy
mechanisms. For example, Kwerel (1977) suggests a permit/subsidy mechanism whereby
1competitive ﬁrms ﬁrst purchase permits whose total supply is determined by ﬁrms’ reported
compliance costs. Competitive ﬁrms can only exaggerate marginal costs by buying permits
at a price above their marginal costs. The government then oﬀers to buy back unused per-
mits at the sale price. If ﬁrms exaggerate marginal costs, they will sell back enough permits
so that the remaining supply of permits is less than the ﬁrst best optimum. Firms are there-
fore better oﬀ reporting truthfully, as exaggerating costs leads to fewer permits and higher
marginal compliance costs. Kwerel’s mechanism, however, requires ﬁrms to be competitive
price takers and to anticipate that other ﬁrms will truthfully reveal their costs.
Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1980), Kim and Chang (1993), and Montero (2008)
achieve the ﬁrst best full information level of regulation with potentially non-competitive
ﬁrms via tax/subsidy or permit/subsidy mechanisms where the subsidy is linked to the
residual marginal beneﬁt of regulating each ﬁrm. For example, Montero (2008) proposes an
elegant mechanism whereby ﬁrms ﬁrst bid for permits via a uniform-price sealed-bid auction.
The regulator then rebates a fraction of the auction revenue to the ﬁrm conditional on the
residual marginal beneﬁt of regulating each ﬁrm. In this way, the beneﬁts of regulation are
transferred to the ﬁrm, and the ﬁrm’s problem becomes identical to the regulator’s. Firms
then optimally choose the ﬁrst best (full information) level of regulation. Montero’s rebate
depends only on the marginal damages, therefore ﬁrms choose the ﬁrst best level of regulation
as a dominant strategy.1
The degree to which each of these mechanisms are used, or could be used, in practice
varies. Mechanisms that rely on perfect competition rule out a host of highly regulated
industries, such as electricity. Similarly, ﬁrms are not typically asked to report each other’s
costs since cost information is likely private (Wiggins and Libecap 1985). However, Montero’s
mechanism is consistent with some regulations.2
Nearly all mechanisms require that the regulator extract payments from the ﬁrm and then
credibly commit to make rebates back to the ﬁrm.3 If the regulator has access to a revenue
stream and legal authority to make payments from that revenue stream, then payments are
plausible. For example, sulfur dioxide permit auction revenue provides a plausible funding
source and the EPA has the authority to design the auction with a rebate. Mason and
1Other mechanisms (Varian 1994, Duggan and Roberts 2002) rely on the assumption that ﬁrms know
each other’s marginal costs. Given this unlikely assumption, however, the regulator can simply require ﬁrm’s
to report all other ﬁrm’s costs, and punish ﬁrms if the results do not agree (Cremer and McLean 1988).
2NOx permit allocations in Sweden have a rebate based on market share (Gersbach and Requae 2004).
In the US, the EPA holds back 2.8% of grandfathered SO2 allowances from ﬁrms, and then auctions them,
rebating the revenue back to the ﬁrms (Joskow and Schmalensee 1998).
3The exception are those mechanisms requiring ﬁrms to know and report each other’s costs. Kwerel’s
mechanism does not use payments to the ﬁrm in equilibrium.
2Plantinga (2010) also proposes a plausible mechanism whereby payments for carbon oﬀsets
are subject to the regulator taking back some payments via a clawback.4
Most regulatory environments, however, do not feature payments from the ﬁrm to the
regulator, nor a legal framework whereby regulators subsidize ﬁrms that report low com-
pliance costs. All command-and-control regulation, for example, by deﬁnition involves no
payments or subsidies. Similarly, permit based regulation in which permits are grandfathered
or otherwise freely allocated do not result in truthful information revelation under most of
the above mechanisms.5 Even if freely allocated permits are interpreted as the end result
of a payment and a rebate, then initial allocations of permits based on historical pollution
emissions is inconsistent with the idea of rewarding ﬁrms that report low compliance costs
with lower net payments.
In contrast, regulators typically have considerable discretion over the interpretation of
vague statutes, the degree to which existing regulations are enforced, granting waivers,6 the
ability to shape future legislation through cost studies, and other decisions aﬀecting the
strength of regulation. For example, “New Source Review” regulation requires that modiﬁ-
cations to a plant which causes a “signiﬁcant increase” in a regulated pollutant receive an
EPA review that typically forces the plant to adopt the best available pollution control tech-
nology (“routine maintenance” is excepted). Both “routine maintenance” and “signiﬁcant
increase” are terms that are not precisely deﬁned, and indeed interpretations of this statute
by the EPA has varied over time (Stavins 2006, footnote 90).
In New Source Review and similar command and control legislation, the regulator has
no discretion to set up a permit or tax/subsidy mechanism. Our results show that the
regulator can improve welfare by timing the regulation: oﬀering ﬁrms a choice of regulation
that becomes either stronger or weaker over time.
Although our paper is primarily normative, in practice regulators sometimes oﬀer ﬁrms
a choice of regulation that either becomes stronger or weaker over time. Joskow and
Schmalensee (1998) provide a detailed examination of the rules of sulfur dioxide permit
trading system created by the 1990 Clean Air Act. One provision gives utilities that install
scrubbers future “bonus” permit allocations. Firms that install scrubbers clearly face more
costly regulation up front, and weaker regulation in the future, since at a minimum their
allocation of permits rises over time. Conversely, by declining the option, ﬁrms save the
4A legislator may have the freedom to design a bill with a payment of an initial allocation of permits.
The allocation would have to be tied to the residual marginal beneﬁts of regulating each ﬁrm, however.
5See Montero (2008) for a formal argument. Montero’s mechanism is an exception.
6The provision of the Patient Protection and Aﬀordable Care Act phasing out annual payment limits has
been temporarily waived for 729 companies (Department of Health and Human Services 2011).
3up front cost of scrubbers, but do not gain bonus permits later. Thus declining the option
results in regulation which becomes stronger over time.7
Even if the regulation is such that payments to and from the ﬁrm are possible, the
absence of lump sum taxes means that payments to the ﬁrm could instead be used to reduce
labor or other distortionary taxes (Bovenberg and Goulder 1996). As shown by Montero
(2008), the regulator using payments then faces a tradeoﬀ between information revelation
and the distortionary cost of government funds. Therefore, with a distortionary cost of funds,
payment-based mechanisms no longer achieve the ﬁrst best. Our mechanism, which trades
oﬀ current and future distortions, also does not achieve the ﬁrst best. Nonetheless, we show
that with any positive cost of funds, the optimal regulation involves some degree of timing,
even when payments are available. Further, we derive a cutoﬀ cost of funds such that, if the
cost of funds is higher than the cutoﬀ, the optimal regulation policy does not use payments
at all and instead uses our timing mechanism exclusively.8
The cutoﬀ can be very reasonable in practice. Suppose for example, that the a priori
probability of a ﬁrm having low costs is small. Then low cost ﬁrms can plausibly claim to
have high costs, so large payments are required to induce ﬁrms to reveal low cost shocks.
In contrast, with our timing mechanism, low cost ﬁrms now strongly anticipate reverting to
the high cost type in the next period. Low cost ﬁrms are thus willing to accept stronger
regulation today in exchange for slightly weaker regulation in the future. Thus, when the
probability of low costs is small, the regulator need only oﬀer low cost ﬁrms slightly weaker
future regulation.
The timing mechanism takes advantage of ﬁrm uncertainty over future cost shocks. Many
authors consider time varying compliance cost shocks which ﬁt naturally into our framework.
Newell and Pizer (2003) and Karp and Zhang (2005) evaluate tax and permit based regulation
with time-varying cost shocks. Kelly (2005) evaluates tax and permit based regulation when
ﬁrms receive productivity shocks. Heutel (2009) and Fischer and Springborn (2011) evaluate
tax and permit based regulation for climate change when ﬁrms are subject to productivity
shocks which follow an autoregressive process. Productivity shocks ﬁt naturally into our
7The Clean Air Act allows pollution permit “banking” (Ellerman and Montero 2007), which also gives
ﬁrms some control over the strength of regulation over time. However, we show in section 2.2 that our timing
mechanism yields higher welfare than permit banking, since the timing mechanism induces ﬁrms to reveal
cost shocks, while banking does not.
8Our result should not be confused with the dynamic moral hazard literature, in which it is optimal
for the principal to use both payments and continuation values to reward agents. Here, the gains to the
principal from using the continuation value as compensation are not driven by “payment smoothing.” In our
mechanism, payments in the form of weaker regulation are not perfect substitutes across time to the agent,
which the principal exploits to gain information.
4framework since ﬁrms know current, but not future, shocks. Our paper extends this literature
by deriving the optimal dynamic regulation with dependent cost shocks. A number of other
natural interpretations of time varying costs shocks exist. For example, input prices vary
randomly over time and future cost saving innovations are uncertain.
Our mechanism relies on commitment: the ability of the regulator to commit to weak
(strong) regulation in the future for ﬁrms that reports low (high) costs today.9 A number of
papers (e.g. Freixas, Guesnerie, and Tirole 1985, Yao 1988) study models in which marginal
costs are ﬁxed and not subject to shocks. In this case, the regulator who learns a ﬁrm
has permanently low costs has an incentive to renege on a commitment to weak regulation
and instead impose the optimal regulation given the known low compliance costs in the
second period (the “ratchet eﬀect”). In contrast, the incentive to renege is relatively minor
in our mechanism. If cost shocks are iid, then the regulator who learns the ﬁrm has low
costs in period one has only prior information about the ﬁrm’s costs in period two. The
regulator thus does not desire to ratchet up the regulation to the optimal level given known
low compliance costs in period two, but instead only desires to strengthen the regulation to
the optimal level given the prior.
One way to solve the commitment problem is through contracts. Baron and Besanko
(1987) argue that relationships between regulators and public utilities are in practice char-
acterized by contracts whereby the regulator agrees to give the ﬁrm a minimum (“fair”)
proﬁt, and the ﬁrm agrees not to withdraw from the relationship as long as the regulator
maintains the minimum proﬁt.10 In addition, if the discount factor is suﬃciently high and
the regulator and ﬁrm have repeated interactions, then commitment is possible (Yao 1988).
For this reason, we have in mind repeated interactions between a career regulator and ﬁrm,
rather than a more temporary political appointee.11
Many regulations involve repeated long run interactions between the ﬁrm and regulator
(Baron and Besanko 1987). Indeed, many studies of such long run relationships argue the
result is regulatory capture: because the regulator and the ﬁrm have repeated interactions,
9All permit-subsidy schemes require commitment at some level, since otherwise the regulator would renege
on the subsidy.
10Conversely, Hahn (1989) notes that some permit regulations are written speciﬁcally so that the regu-
lator may devalue existing permits without compensation. For example, the sulfur dioxide permit system
legislation states that the EPA may abandon the permit system without compensation at any time. How-
ever, Joskow and Schmalensee (1998, footnote 4) note that the EPA issued permits several years ahead as a
commitment device, making it politically diﬃcult to renege (indeed, the sulfur permit system has now been
in place for 20 years and the EPA has not reneged).
11Guasch, Laﬀont, and Straub (2008) show the probability of contract renegotiation between regulators
and ﬁrms in Latin America decreases signiﬁcantly when a regulatory agency negotiates the original contract.
Besley and Coate (2003) show ﬁrms extract more rents from elected than appointed regulators.
5the regulator is more responsive to the ﬁrm’s needs and regulation tends to be weak (Besley
and Coate 2003).12 Our model provides an alternative explanation to regulatory capture.
What looks like lax regulation may simply be the regulator following through on a com-
mitment. These two hypothesis can be resolved empirically, due to the model’s testable
predicted relationship between past and future regulation for diﬀerent types of ﬁrms.
Although the regulator oﬀers weaker regulation in the second period to low cost ﬁrms,
our mechanism maximizes welfare and is thus preferred by households. Furthermore, we
show in section 2.4 that both high and low cost ﬁrms weakly prefer our mechanism to the
benchmark level of regulation imposed when the regulator has only prior information about
ﬁrm costs. In addition, we describe in section 7 how our mechanism may be implemented
using waivers or credits, which are commonly used in environmental regulation. Therefore,
our mechanism is relatively straightforward to implement in practice.13
Our basic framework assumes the ﬁrm has access only to a static method of regulatory
compliance. Suppose the ﬁrm can make a dynamic capital investment that complies with the
regulation (e.g. install scrubbers) at lower cost than the static method (e.g. switching from
high to low sulfur coal). A natural concern is that our timing mechanism may cause ﬁrms
to under invest in cost-saving capital. We show in section 5 that in fact ﬁrms undertake the
socially optimal level of investment, and our mechanism is unchanged except that ﬁrms are
now either above and then below a baseline increasing trend in regulatory stringency or the
reverse, depending on the cost shock.14
Section 2 solves for the optimal mechanism in the basic model with one ﬁrm and deter-
mines the properties of the mechanism. Section 3 does the same when the government has
a cost of funds. Section 4 extends the mechanism to n ﬁrms, section 5 considers dynamic
investment and declining costs, and section 6 considers more general stochastic processes for
the marginal cost shocks.
2 Model: Two period problem with a single ﬁrm
Consider a regulator imposing a level of regulation q on a ﬁrm whose compliance costs are
unknown. The strength of regulation is increasing in q; q = 0 represents an unregulated
12Laﬀont and Tirole (1991) shows that politicians may weaken the power of regulators if regulatory capture
is likely.
13Our mechanism, however, does require prior cost information, whereas Montero’s requires only the
marginal damages.
14Yao (1988) points out that ﬁrms may under invest in cost saving R&D if the regulator cannot commit
to strict regulation in the future.
6ﬁrm. The function B (q) speciﬁes the beneﬁts of regulation, which we assume are increasing
and concave. The regulator seeks to maximize expected welfare w over two periods, t = 1,2.
Let δ be the discount factor, then:
W = E[w(q1,π1)] + δE[w(q2,π2)], where (2.1)
w(q,π) = B (q) − C (q,π). (2.2)
Here the compliance cost of the regulation to the ﬁrm is C (q,π), which is increasing and
weakly convex in q and increasing in the cost shock π. Throughout the paper, subscripts
on functions denote partial derivatives. We assume π is unknown to the regulator in both
periods. The ﬁrm knows the cost shock in the ﬁrst period, and learns π2 at the beginning of
period two. The cost shock follows an iid Bernoulli process: πt = πL with probability γ and
πH otherwise, for t = 1,2. Let πL < πH, so πL indicates low compliance costs.15 We assume
Cq (0,πH) < Bq (0), so that some regulation is optimal even if compliance costs are high.
The ﬁrm incurs the costs, but not the beneﬁts of regulation. Firm proﬁts are nega-
tively aﬀected by compliance costs, and the expected change in ﬁrm proﬁts arising from the
regulation is:
wf (q1,q2,π1) = −C (q1,π1) − δE[C (q2,π)]. (2.3)
An example is environmental regulation. If E is emissions, with uncontrolled emissions
equal to E0, then q = E0 − E can be interpreted as regulation implementing an emissions
standard of E or a supply of E emissions permits. Similarly, C (E0 − E,π) is the cost of
reducing emissions and D = D0 − B (E0 − E) are the convex damages from emissions.
2.1 Two Period Contract
The regulator requires the ﬁrm to report ˆ π in the ﬁrst period. The ﬁrm may report either
low (ˆ π = πL) or high (ˆ π = πH) compliance costs. The regulator commits to a set of policies
q (ˆ π), based on the ﬁrm’s report. If the ﬁrm reports low compliance costs, then the regulator
implements q1L in the ﬁrst period and q2L in the second period, whereas if the ﬁrm reports
high compliance costs, the regulator implements {q1H,q2H}. The regulator cannot condition
regulation in period two on the ﬁrm’s report in period two, because the ﬁrm would always
report the type with the smallest regulation costs. Clearly a ﬁrm with low compliance costs
15We relax the iid assumption in section 6.
7has an incentive to report high compliance costs to induce the regulator to implement weaker
regulation. We assume that if the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between reporting truthfully or not, the
ﬁrm reports truthfully.
Incentive compatibility requires that truthful reporting maximizes proﬁts for both types
of ﬁrms.
wf (q1L,q2L,πL) ≥ wf (q1H,q2H,πL), (2.4)
wf (q1H,q2H,πH) ≥ wf (q1L,q2L,πH). (2.5)
Our strategy is to compute the regulations which maximizes welfare subject to the constraint
that the low cost ﬁrm not misrepresent itself as a high cost ﬁrm. We will then verify that,
under mild conditions, the solution implies a high cost ﬁrm will not wish to claim costs
are low. That is, constraint (2.5) is not binding at the solution of the relaxed problem of
maximizing (2.1) subject to (2.4). Therefore, the Lagrangian for the relaxed problem is:











wf (q1L,q2L,πL) − wf (q1H,q2H,πL)
 
(2.6)
Because the mechanism is incentive compatible, the objective function is formulated antici-
pating truth telling on the part of the ﬁrm.




















Bq (q2H) = E[Cq (q2H,π)] (2.10)
8C (q1H,πL) − C (q1L,πL) + δ(E[C (q2H,π)] − E[C (q2L,π)]) = 0 (2.11)
Equations (2.7)-(2.11) deﬁne the optimal regulatory structure. Since λ > 0, the regulator is
forced to move marginal beneﬁts away from marginal costs in order to induce truth telling.
To complete the solution we must show constraint (2.5) is satisﬁed:
PROPOSITION 1 Suppose C is super-modular in [q,π]. Then the solution to problem
(2.6) satisﬁes condition (2.5).
All proofs are in the appendix. A twice diﬀerentiable function is super modular if and only if
the cross partial derivative is positive. Thus we are assuming Cqπ > 0, or that π is a positive
shock to the ﬁrm’s marginal costs, which is a standard assumption.
2.2 Properties of the Timing Mechanism
We ﬁrst derive some properties of the solution, and then use these properties to develop an





deﬁne the spread between high and low marginal costs. Two natural benchmarks are the
full information (ﬁrst best) and prior information regulation policies. The full information
regulations, {q∗
L,q∗




i) = Cq (q
∗
i,πi), i = L,H. (2.13)
The prior information regulation policy, ¯ q, equates the marginal beneﬁts of regulation with
the expected marginal cost:
Bq (¯ q) = E[Cq (¯ q,π)]. (2.14)
Clearly, q∗
H < ¯ q < q∗
L. Proposition 2 describes the relationship between the optimal dynamic
mechanism and these benchmarks.
PROPOSITION 2 The solution to the two period problem has the following properties:
2.1. q∗
H < q1H < ¯ q and q1L < q∗
L, and if R is constant, then ¯ q < q1L.
2.2. q2L < ¯ q < q2H.
92.3. 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 − γ.
Proposition 2 indicates that the optimal second best period one regulation levels lie
between the no information regulation levels and their full information counterparts. Thus,
ﬁrst period welfare is higher in the mechanism than under no information regardless of ﬁrm
type. Proposition 2.2 speciﬁes the incentive cost of the ﬁrst period welfare gains. In the
second period, the ex ante optimal level of regulation for both types is ¯ q, but the low type
receives q2L < ¯ q and the high type receives q2H > ¯ q. These distortions provide the low
cost ﬁrm with incentives to accept stronger regulation in the ﬁrst period. However, the low
cost ﬁrm expects higher costs in period two, and therefore values weaker regulation more in
period two. Therefore, the welfare cost of the optimal second period distortions is smaller
than the ﬁrst period gains. Section 2.3 gives a more detailed intuition.
In period two, the regulator has only prior information about costs and prefers ¯ q, regard-
less of what the ﬁrm reported in the ﬁrst period. The incentive to renege is therefore more
moderate here than the typical ratchet eﬀect. If able to renege, the regulator would prefer
to set q = ¯ q rather than the stronger q = q∗
L, as in a model with a ﬁxed type.
2.3 Graphical Intuition
Figure 1 illustrates the intuition when δ = 1 for clarity.16
16A low discount factor means the low cost ﬁrm requires more compensation in the form of weaker regula-
tion in the second period. However, the regulator now discounts the welfare loss of weaker regulation for the
low cost type in the second period more relative to the gains in the ﬁrst period. So the qualitative properties
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Figure 1: Intuition for the regulator’s problem.
The typical welfare loss (e.g. the loss with an emissions standard or tradeable emissions
permits) when the regulator has only prior information about ﬁrm costs in period one equals
the average (weighted by γ) of the red and blue areas. Suppose the regulator sets the level
of regulation at ¯ q, which sets marginal beneﬁts equal to expected marginal costs. With
probability γ, the ﬁrm has low marginal costs, and thus marginal beneﬁts exceed marginal
costs, creating a welfare loss equal to the area of the bottom blue and red areas. With
probability 1 − γ, marginal costs exceed marginal beneﬁts, and welfare loss is the area of
the top blue and red areas. Now suppose the regulator imposes q1L or q1H depending on the
ﬁrm’s report. Given truthful reporting, expected welfare loss falls to the weighted average
of the area of the two red triangles. However, a ﬁrm with low costs now gets higher proﬁts
by claiming to be the high cost type. The gain in proﬁts for a low cost ﬁrm claiming to be
the high cost type in the ﬁrst period is the green polygon. Thus the regulator must increase
the return to reporting low costs in the second period to oﬀset the loss in proﬁts in the ﬁrst
period. Further, the marginal loss to the low cost ﬁrm from a marginal increase in q1L is
Cq (q1L,πL).
Looking forward to the second period, all ﬁrms expect marginal costs equal to E[Cq (q,π)],
since the actual period two cost shock is unknown in period one. Thus the low cost ﬁrm
11expects costs to rise in period two. But then the low cost ﬁrm values lenient regulation more
in the second period more than in the ﬁrst period (the opposite is true for the high cost
ﬁrm, which is why the high cost ﬁrm is not motivated to report low costs). Conversely, the
regulator has no knowledge of ﬁrm costs in either period and is thus indiﬀerent as to which
period has the stronger regulation. By setting q2L < q2H, the low cost ﬁrm expects to gain
proﬁts in the second period equal to the area of the green polygon by reporting truthfully.
Thus the regulator must set the area of the two green polygons in Figure 1 to be equal in
order to induce truthful reporting. A marginal decrease in q2L raises expected proﬁts in the
second period by E[Cq (q2L,π)]. Thus a marginal increase of ρδ in q1L requires a marginal
decrease in q2L such that:





But since the ﬁrm expects higher costs in period two, q1L − q1H > q2H − q2L. The regulator
can therefore achieve welfare gains in period one at a smaller cost of welfare loss in period
two (the red triangles). The regulator continues to raise q1L − q1H and q2H − q2L until the
weighted average of the areas of the red triangles in period one equal the weighted average
of the red triangles in period two. At this point, welfare gains in period one are small and
welfare losses in period two are high enough to oﬀset the fact that the regulator need only
decrease q2L by δρ in order to achieve a marginal increase in q1L.
2.4 Quadratic Example
To further illustrate the mechanism, consider the following quadratic example:





C (q) = πq. (2.18)
Solving equations (2.7)-(2.11) given the functions (2.17)-(2.18) results in:
q1L = ¯ q + (1 − γ)∆π
δρ2
1 + δρ2, (2.19)
12q1H = ¯ q − γ∆π
δρ2
1 + δρ2, (2.20)
q2L = ¯ q − (1 − γ)∆π
ρ
1 + δρ2, (2.21)
q2H = ¯ q + γ∆π
ρ
1 + δρ2, (2.22)
λ =
γ (ρ − 1)
1 + δρ2 , (2.23)
∆π ≡ πH − πL, ρ ≡
¯ π
πL
, ¯ q = θ − ¯ π. (2.24)
The degree to which the regulations diﬀer from the no-information benchmark, ¯ q, depends
critically on the variability of π in two diﬀerent ways. First, an increase in the cost diﬀerence
∆π moves all four optimal regulations away from ¯ q. As the diﬀerence increases, the returns
to implementing the mechanism increase. When the gap is large implementing ¯ q results in
large welfare losses, because q∗
L and q∗
H are far from ¯ q. Therefore, the regulator moves q1L
and q1H away from ¯ q, and thus q2L and q2H also move away from ¯ q to maintain incentive
compatibility. Second, for large values of ρ,17 the low cost ﬁrm anticipates much higher costs
in the second period, and so the regulator need only oﬀer a relatively small weakening of
second period regulation to induce the low cost ﬁrm to report truthfully. Thus q1L and q1H
move away from ¯ q towards their ﬁrst best levels for large ρ, as it is cheaper to implement the
mechanism. The eﬀect of ρ on q2L and q2H is ambiguous. On one hand the regulator needs to
weaken (strengthen) the second period regulation less for the low (high) cost ﬁrm to satisfy
the incentive constraint, which moves q2L and q2H towards ¯ q. But because the mechanism
is overall cheaper to implement, the regulator widens the spread in the ﬁrst period, which
tends to widen the spread in the second period.
The variance of the cost shock also increases the value of the information gained through
the mechanism. With no information, the regulator adopts ¯ q each period and expected
welfare is:
W (¯ q, ¯ q) =
1
2
(1 + δ) ¯ q
2. (2.25)



























represents the regulator’s gains from using the optimal mechanism. With quadratic prefer-
ences, E[q1] = E[q2] = ¯ q, so the welfare gains arise from reducing compliance costs, rather
than higher beneﬁts of regulation. Welfare is directly proportional to the variance of the
prior, γ (1 − γ)∆π2, since an increase in the prior variance directly increases the returns to
acquiring information about ﬁrm type. Welfare is also increasing in ρ, since an increase in ρ
makes the mechanism cheaper to implement.
By reporting a low cost shock instead of a high cost shock in period one, the ﬁrm expects
proﬁts to rise by
(1 − γ)
ρ2∆π2
(1 + δρ2)(ρ − 1)
. (2.28)
in the second period. As ∆π increases, the regulator must increase second period compensa-
tion to the low cost ﬁrm, as the regulator moves q1L and q1H away from ¯ q. The eﬀect of an
increase in ρ on compensation to the low cost ﬁrm depends on whether the regulator moves
q1L and q1H far enough away from ¯ q so that overall compensation to the low cost ﬁrm must
increase despite the decrease in the cost of the mechanism.
Consider ﬁnally expected ﬁrm proﬁts, which from (2.3) satisfy:
wf (q1L,q2L,πL) = wf (¯ q, ¯ q,πL), (2.29)
wf (q1H,q2H,πH) > wf (¯ q, ¯ q,πH). (2.30)
Firms of either type weakly prefer the optimal mechanism over ¯ q. Therefore, the industry
will support a transition from the prior information policy to the optimal mechanism either
before or after learning the cost shock.
2.5 Other Mechanisms
Other regulation systems also give ﬁrms some discretion to choose the strength of regulation
over time, but do not reveal ﬁrm costs, and thus result in lower welfare than our mechanism.
Consider, for example, pollution permit “banking.” In our framework, permit banking regu-
lation requires that ﬁrms implement a minimum lifetime level of regulation ˆ q, but gives ﬁrms
14the discretion to choose the level of regulation in each period.18 The ﬁrm’s problem is then:
max
q1i,q2i
wf (q1i,q2i,πi), s.t. q1i + q2i ≥ ˆ q, i = L,H. (2.31)
The ﬁrm ﬁrst order condition is:
Cq (q1i,πi) = E[Cq (q2i,π)], i = L,H. (2.32)
Banking regulation equalizes expected marginal costs across time for both ﬁrms. Equations
(2.7)-(2.10) imply the optimal timing mechanism equalizes marginal costs over time for the
low type only. Since costs are convex, both the ﬁrm and the regulator desire to equalize
marginal costs over time. However, in the optimal timing mechanism marginal costs are not
equal for the high type to discourage the low type from claiming to have high costs.19 Infor-
mation revelation allows the regulator to better tailor regulation to ﬁrm costs. The welfare
gains resulting from information revelation outweigh the costs of not equalizing marginal
costs over time for the high type, so the timing mechanism yields higher welfare.20
In other mechanisms (Montero 2008) the ﬁrm receives a monetary payment that is in-
creasing in the strength of regulation. Monetary payments induce the ﬁrm to reveal costs,
despite the stronger regulation that the low cost ﬁrm must endure by reporting low costs.
The monetary payment transfers the beneﬁts of regulation to the ﬁrm, inducing the ﬁrm to
choose the ﬁrst best optimal regulation. Here, the regulator transfers beneﬁts in the form of
weaker future regulation to the low cost ﬁrm, and the reverse to the ﬁrm reporting high costs
in the ﬁrst period. Varying the strength of regulation in the second period to satisfy the
incentive constraint creates distortions, so the ﬁrst best level of regulation does not result.
To contrast our results with the literature using monetary payments, we must monetize
the value of lenient regulation. Suppose we adopt the proposal of Montero (2008), and
specify the following mechanism:
1. The ﬁrm reports its type, and speciﬁes a demand for subsidies ˆ P (q,π). The ﬁrm must
submit demand schedules for both periods in the ﬁrst period.
2. The regulator sets the subsidy rate to solve ˆ P (q,π) = Bq (q).
18For example, using the notation in the paragraph after equation (2.3), the ﬁrm receives E = E0 − 1
2 ˆ q
permits in each period and may both save and borrow permits.
19The high cost type does not want to claim low costs, which is why the regulator is free to equalize
marginal costs over time for the low cost type.
20The optimal banking regulation system could be implemented by adding (2.32) as an extra constraint
to problem (2.6). Since the unconstrained problem does not equalize the marginal costs, the constrained
problem must result in lower welfare.
153. The ﬁrm chooses a level of regulation for both periods prior to learning the second
period cost shock, and pays a fraction α(q,π) of the total value of the subsidies back
to the regulator.
Notice that the subsidy is independent of the report, instead the regulator uses the rebate
α to induce truthful reporting. The low cost ﬁrm’s problem is thus:
maxq1L,q2L
 
(1 − α(q1L,πL)) ˆ P (q1L,π) − C (q1L,πL)+
δ
 




maxq1L,q2L {(1 − α(q1L,πL))Bq (q1L) − C (q1L,πL)+




















Next, following Montero, we specify:




which results in the ﬁrm’s problem simplifying to:
max
q1L,q2L
{fLB (q1L) − C (q1L,πL) + δ(fLB (q2L) − E[C (q2L,πL)])}. (2.38)
The above problem, along with the corresponding rebates if the ﬁrm reports high costs,
generates a solution identical to equations (2.7)-(2.11).
In general the regulator transfers a fraction of the beneﬁts of regulation to the ﬁrm in
each period. The fraction is fL < 1 if the ﬁrm reports low costs, and f1H > 1 and f2H > 1
if the ﬁrm reports high costs. The regulator cannot transfer the full beneﬁts of regulation
to the ﬁrm without violating the truth-telling constraint. The fraction in general depends
on λ, the shadow price of the incentive constraint, which is endogenous, but bounded by
16proposition (2.3).21
3 Cost of Funds
Suppose now the regulator may oﬀer payments to the ﬁrm conditional on the ﬁrm’s reported
type, but such payments are costly for the regulator to oﬀer. Such a cost of funds arises
naturally if lump sum taxes are not possible, and the regulator/government obtains funds
via distortionary taxation, for example (Bovenberg and Goulder 1996).
The regulator can use the payments to extract information about the ﬁrm’s costs in
the second period. Therefore, the regulator requires the ﬁrm to give a cost report in each
period, {ˆ π1, ˆ π2}. The regulator may condition regulation in period two on both reports.
Let q2ij ≡ q (ˆ πi, ˆ πj) denote the level of regulation in period two if the ﬁrm reported type i
in period 1 and j in period 2. Since the timing of the problem is such that the regulator
implements the regulation in period one before the ﬁrm learns the cost shock in the second
period, the regulation in period one depends only on the period one report. Similarly, let
t1i ≡ t1 (ˆ πi) be the ﬁrst period payment from the regulator to the ﬁrm if the ﬁrm reports
type i in period one and let t2ij ≡ t2 (ˆ πi, ˆ πj) be the payment in the second period if the ﬁrm
reports type i in period one and type j in period 2.
Incentive compatibility requires that a low cost ﬁrm in period two receive proﬁts from
reporting low costs which are not less than proﬁts from reporting high costs:
−c(q2iL,πL) + t2iL ≥ −c(q2iH,πL) + t2iH , i = L,H. (3.1)
Similarly, a high cost ﬁrm in period two must receive higher proﬁts from reporting high costs:
−c(q2iH,πH) + t2iH ≥ −c(q2iL,πH) + t2iL , i = L,H. (3.2)
The ﬁrst period incentive compatibility constraints are:
wf (q1L,q2 (πL,π),πL) + t1L + δE(t2 (πL,π)) ≥
wf (q1H,q2 (πH,π),πL) + t1H + δE(t2 (πH,π)), (3.3)
21Note that Montero’s mechanism requires no prior cost information to set the subsidy or rebate. That
is, with fL = 1 in equation (2.37), both the price and the rebate depend only on the beneﬁt function. The
ﬁrm need not report costs, since the ﬁrm essentially chooses the level of regulation. In general fL depends
on prior cost information through λ and γ. So if monetary payments are not possible, the regulator requires
more prior information.
17wf (q1H,q2 (πH,π),πH) + t1H + δE(t2 (πH,π)) ≥
wf (q1L,q2 (πL,π),πH) + t1L + δE(t2 (πL,π)). (3.4)
It is well known (Montero 2008) that the regulator can achieve the ﬁrst best allocation
by imposing a suﬃciently large lump sum tax on the ﬁrm. The regulator need only make
the diﬀerence in total payments from the ﬁrm to the regulator equal to the beneﬁts of
regulation. Because the ﬁrm pays the regulator regardless of the ﬁrm’s choice, the cost
of funds is irrelevant. Therefore, similar to Montero (2008), we impose a restriction that
payments from the regulator to the ﬁrm not be too small. In particular, we impose that
lifetime payments are positive, regardless of the ﬁrm’s reports:22
t1i + δt2ij ≥ 0 , i,j = L,H. (3.5)
The regulator’s problem is to maximize expected welfare, W, given a cost of funds φ > 0.
The maximization is subject to (3.1)-(3.5). For this problem, the timing of the payments is
irrelevant. That is, the regulator and ﬁrm are indiﬀerent between a payment in period one





t1i + t2ij. (3.6)
The regulator’s problem then simpliﬁes to:
maxq,t γw(q1L,πL) + (1 − γ)w(q1H,πH) + δγ
2w(q1LL,πL) +










−c(q2iL,πL) + tiL ≥ −c(q2iH,πL) + tiH , i = L,H, (3.8)
22Suppose condition (3.5) did not hold. Then there exists a t∗
ij such that t1i + δt2ij = t∗
ij − ¯ T, where
¯ T = −minij (t1i + δt2ij) is a lump sum tax on the ﬁrm and t∗ satisﬁes (3.5). Therefore, we are ruling out
lump sum taxes on the ﬁrm. This is sensible since a “lump sum” tax on ﬁrms would in fact cause distortions
not modeled here: households would reduce savings and increase consumption, and some low proﬁt ﬁrms
would exit the market. In a more complicated model, the optimal solution would weigh the cost of these
distortions against the beneﬁts of government revenue and information revelation.
23Typically, with full commitment, the timing of payments is irrelevant.
18−c(q2iH,πH) + tiH ≥ −c(q2iL,πH) + tiL , i = L,H, (3.9)
wf (q1L,q2 (πL,π),πL) + E(t(πL,π)) ≥ wf (q1H,q2 (πH,π),πL) + E(t(πH,π)), (3.10)
wf (q1H,q2 (πH,π),πH) + E(t(πH,π)) ≥ wf (q1L,q2 (πL,π),πH) + E(t(πL,π)), (3.11)
tij ≥ 0, i,j = L,H. (3.12)
Similar to the problem without a cost of funds, we solve a relaxed problem where only
some constraints bind. We then show that the solution satisﬁes the remaining constraints.
The non-binding constraints are (3.9), i = L,H, and (3.11). Let λLL and λLH be the
Lagrange multipliers on (3.8), i = L,H, respectively. Further, let λL be the multiplier for
(3.10) and  ij be the multipliers for (3.12).
Appendix 8.3 gives the ﬁrst order conditions for problem (3.7). The ﬁrst order conditions
indicate the regulator can use payments to reduce the multipliers on the incentive compat-
ibility constraints, thus moving regulation closer to the ﬁrst best, but at a cost of funds
φ. We next ask to what extent the regulator uses payments versus our timing mechanism
described in section 2.1. If payments are zero and qi  = q2Li  = q2Hi, then the regulator,
by non-trivially using the ﬁrst period report in the second period regulation, is timing the
regulation exclusively. Conversely, if payments are positive and qi = q2Li = q2Hi then the
regulator is using payments, but not timing the regulation. It is immediate (see 8.47 and
8.48) that the regulator sets tHH = 0, but other payments may be positive or zero depending
on φ and the size of the multipliers.
Without a cost of funds, we ﬁnd the well-known result that the regulator achieves ﬁrst
best using only payments.
PROPOSITION 3 Let C be super modular in [q,π] and φ = 0. Then the solution to (3.7)
has q1L = q1LL = q1HL = q∗
L and q1H = q2LH = q2HH = q∗
H. That is, the regulator achieves
ﬁrst best using payments, and does not use the timing mechanism.
If the cost of funds is suﬃciently high, however, the regulator uses the timing mechanism
and no payments.







19then the solution to (2.6) solves problem (3.7), with tij = 0 for all i,j. That is, the regulator
relies only on the timing mechanism and does not use payments.
So for a cost of funds suﬃciently large, the regulator does not use any payments, but
instead relies on the timing mechanism to induce incentive compatibility in the ﬁrst period.
As γ → 1, the critical threshold approaches zero. Intuitively, as γ → 1, the low type may
plausibly imitate the high type. The regulator must then give the low cost ﬁrm a relatively
high payment to induce a truthful report. However, as γ → 1, the low type ﬁrm becomes a
high type next period with high probability. The low type ﬁrm thus strongly prefers weaker
regulation in the second period and the regulator need only oﬀer slightly weaker regulation
in the second period to induce truthful revelation of low costs. Thus the timing mechanism
tends to work well when payments do not and vice versa.
The presence of R in equation (3.13) occurs since a large spread between marginal costs
of the high and low type implies a large welfare gain from moving to the ﬁrst best regulation.
The regulator is therefore more motivated to use payments even if φ is large.
For φ small, the regulator uses both payments and the timing mechanism.
PROPOSITION 5 Let C be super modular in [q,π] and φ > 0. Then q1H = q2LH = q2HH
does not hold. That is, the regulator relies at least in part on the timing mechanism.
Proposition 5 is most interesting because in practice the absence of lump sum taxes im-
plies the cost of funds to the regulator is positive. Therefore, in practice using the timing
mechanism is optimal.
4 Multiple ﬁrms
In this section, we allow for multiple ﬁrms and show that the qualitative results continue to
hold. Suppose now n ﬁrms exist, each of which receives an independently distributed cost
shock equal to πL with probability γ and πH otherwise. We assume the timing is such that
the regulator collects all reports, and then assigns regulation to each ﬁrm in each period
based on all reports. All ﬁrms that report low costs are identical to the regulator, and
thus receive identical regulation. Let 0 ≤ m ≤ n be the number of ﬁrms reporting the low
cost shock. If m ﬁrms report low costs, ﬁrms receive regulation qij,m = qi (πj,m), i = 1,2,
j = L,H. We further assume that regulation of one ﬁrm is a perfect substitute for regulating
another in the beneﬁt function:
Bi = B (mqiL,m + (n − m)qiH,m), i = 1,2. (4.1)
20Let Pr(m|i) denote the probability that m ﬁrms received the low cost shock, conditional
on one ﬁrm receiving shock i ∈ {L,M}. The incentive constraints (2.4)-(2.5) for low and













Here the ﬁrm takes expectations since other ﬁrms’ costs are unknown. Mechanisms that sat-
isfy (4.2) and (4.3) imply truthful revelation of information is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.






B (mq1L,m + (n − m)q1H,m) − mC (q1L,m,πL) − (n − m)C (q1H,m,πH)







wf (q1L,m,q2L,m,πL) − wf (q1H,m−1,q2H,m−1,πL)
 
(4.4)
All low cost ﬁrms have the same incentive constraints and thus λ does not vary by ﬁrm.
The ﬁrst order condition for q1L,m is:







Note that, from the properties of the binomial distribution, the probability that m of n ﬁrms
are low type conditional on one known low type equals the probably that m − 1 of n − 1
remaining ﬁrms are the low type:
Pr(m|L) =










Thus, the ﬁrst order condition reduces to:







21Next, via a similar calculation:






















The second period ﬁrst order conditions are:














The ﬁrst order conditions for ﬁrms reporting low costs revert back to those of section 2.1
for n = m = 1, and the ﬁrst order conditions for ﬁrms that report high costs revert to those
of section 2.1 for n = 1 and m = 0. Indeed, the results change only in that the marginal
beneﬁts are lower with more ﬁrms since costs increase linearly with the number of ﬁrms but
beneﬁts are concave.24
Equations (4.7), (4.10), and (4.11)-(4.12) imply that the equi-marginal principle is vio-
lated in both periods. The regulator cannot equalize marginal costs across types without
violating the incentive constraint.
We deﬁne the optimal regulation with only prior information for n ﬁrms, ¯ qn as the solution
to:
maxB (n¯ qn) − nE[C (¯ qn,π)], (4.13)
Bq (n¯ qn) = E[Cq (¯ qn,π)]. (4.14)
24For the limiting case, normalize the size of each ﬁrm to 1/n, then as n → ∞, total regulation approaches
γqjL + (1 − γ)qjH, j = 1,2. This case diﬀers from section 2.1 only in that here the regulator faces no
aggregate uncertainty.
























Proposition 6 shows that optimal mechanism is analogous with n ﬁrms.
PROPOSITION 6 Let C be super modular and R be constant. Then the solution to the
two period problem with n ﬁrms has the following properties:
6.1. q1H,m < ¯ qn < q1L,m.
6.2. q2L,m < ¯ qn < q2H,m.
6.3. q1H,m and q1L,m are increasing functions of m.
With n ﬁrms, the optimal mechanism is to oﬀer each ﬁrm a choice of regulation which
becomes either more stringent or more lax over time. The high cost ﬁrms all select regulation
which is initially more lax and the low cost ﬁrms all select regulation which is initially more
stringent.
5 Endogenous Investment and Declining Costs
Frequently, ﬁrms undertake investment or R&D which reduces compliance costs over time.
In response, regulation often becomes more strict over time. Here we suppose that ﬁrms
may undertake endogenous investment which reduces compliance costs and show that our
basic result continues to hold. In particular, if regulation becomes more strict over time in
expectation, then the regulator oﬀers one regulation which is above the expected trend in
regulation in the ﬁrst period and is below the expected trend in regulation in the second
period, and a second regulation which is initially below, and subsequently above, the trend.
We consider the model of section 2.1, but assume costs are also a function of investment
ζ in a cost saving technology: C = C (q,π,ζ). We assume Cζ < 0, so investment reduces
costs and Cζζ > 0 so the ﬁrm’s investment problem is concave. We also assume that Cζq < 0,
so that investment reduces marginal costs of compliance as well. Investment is increasing
in regulatory stringency if and only if Cζq < 0. Finally, we assume that the cost function
is such that the second order conditions for the regulator’s problem continue to hold. Let
δPζ denote the price of investment paid in the ﬁrst period and we normalize the stock of
investment in the ﬁrst period to 0.
23The ﬁrm chooses a level of investment after reporting ﬁrst period costs to the regulator.
Because the regulator announces regulation for both periods in the ﬁrst period, the ﬁrm
anticipates the level of regulation in the second period when the investment decision is
made. The ﬁrm’s investment problem conditional on regulation q2i is then:
max
ζ
−C (q1i,π,0) − δE[C (q2i,π,ζ)] − δPζζ. (5.1)
The ﬁrm’s ﬁrst order condition is:
Pζ = −E[Cζ (q2i,π,ζ)], i = L,H. (5.2)
We assume a function ζi = ζ (q2i), i = L,H, satisfying (5.2) exists which maps the level of
regulation the ﬁrm receives upon reporting costs to the regulator into an investment decision.
The change in ﬁrm proﬁts from the regulation becomes:
wf (q1,q2,π1,ζ (q2)) = −C (q1,π1,0) − δE[C (q2,π,ζ (q2))] − δPζζ (q2). (5.3)
The welfare function includes the resource costs of investment:
w(q,π,ζ (q)) = B (q) − C (q,π,ζ (q)) − Pζ   ζ (q). (5.4)
The incentive constraints are then:
wf (q1L,q2L,πL,ζ (q2L)) ≥ wf (q1H,q2H,πL,ζ (q2H)), (5.5)
wf (q1H,q2H,πH,ζ (q2H)) ≥ wf (q1L,q2L,πH,ζ (q2L)). (5.6)
The problem in Lagrange form is then:
Lζ = γ  
 
w(q1L,πL,0) + δE[w(q2L,π,ζ (q2L))]
 











24The investment decision does not aﬀect the ﬁrst order conditions in the ﬁrst period:
















The ﬁrst order condition with respect to q2L is:







However, using (5.2), we see that:







Similarly, using (5.2), the ﬁrst order condition with respect to q2H is:







The incentive constraint binds:
C (q1H,πL,0) − C (q1L,πL,0) =
δ (E[C (q2L,π,ζL)] − E[C (q2H,π,ζH)] + Pζ (ζL − ζH)). (5.13)
From the ﬁrst order conditions, the regulator knows that after assigning a second period level
of regulation, the ﬁrm chooses the optimal level of investment given the regulation. Because
the second period regulation is suboptimal relative to the ﬁrst best level of regulation in the
second period, investment is also not ﬁrst best. But investment is optimal (for both the ﬁrm
and the regulator) conditional on q2, and thus the mechanism is qualitatively unchanged.
For the properties of the mechanism, let ¯ qζ satisfy Bq (¯ qζ) = E[Cq (¯ qζ,π,ζ (¯ qζ))]. Then:
PROPOSITION 7 Let R be constant. Then the solution to problem (5.7) has the following
properties:
7.1. q1H < ¯ q < q1L.
7.2. q2L < ¯ qζ < q2H.
25Note ¯ qζ > ¯ q, so if the regulator has only prior information about ﬁrm costs, regulation
becomes more stringent over time since costs fall. Under our mechanism, the regulator
oﬀers one contract that is initially above and subsequently below the trend line of regulatory
stringency in the prior information case. The other regulation option starts out below the
trend in regulatory stringency, and then is above the trend in the second period.
Thus the mechanism is essentially unchanged. One diﬀerence is that, with declining
costs, the regulator may oﬀer regulation which strengthens over time, but at diﬀerent rates
depending on the ﬁrm’s report. From proposition (7), the high cost ﬁrm is oﬀered regulation
which becomes more stringent over time since q1H < ¯ q < ¯ qζ < q2H. For the ﬁrm reporting
low costs, if costs decline enough, q1L < q2L is possible. The regulator oﬀers the low cost
ﬁrm regulation which becomes more stringent over time, just not as stringent as when the
ﬁrm reports high costs. Thus the results are consistent with the empirical observation that
regulation tends to strengthen over time as costs decline.
6 More General Marginal Cost Processes
The previous sections assume marginal cost shocks are iid. In that case, the ﬁrm and the
regulator have identical information regarding marginal costs in the second period. Indepen-
dent shocks might be appropriate if, for example, input prices ﬂuctuate around a stationary
value. For example, the marginal cost of stricter sulfur regulations might rise as the price
of low sulfur coal rises. However, for some applications, correlated costs are more appro-
priate (Stavins 1996, Heutel 2009). Further, for some applications, asymmetric information
may be persistent (that is, asymmetric information may exist regarding second period ex-
pected costs). Finally, a more general stochastic process for the marginal costs shocks yields
additional insights as to the nature of the mechanism.
Let c(q,π) = πc(q). Suppose ﬁrst period costs are unchanged (Pr(π1 = πL) = γ), but
second period costs are now:
E(π2|π1 = πL) = ¯ πL and E(π2|π1 = πH) = ¯ πH. (6.14)
Thus, ¯ πi represents a ﬁrm’s expectations about period two costs, given cost realization πi in
period one. Equation (6.14) allows for the most general dependent cost structures possible
in a two period model. Because contracting happens at time one, from the perspective
of both regulator and ﬁrm only the conditional expectations ¯ πi = E[π2|π1] enter into the
objective function and the constraints. Therefore, equation (6.14) supports any dependent
26distribution F (x|π1). Below, we describe a number of natural cases of this speciﬁcation.
• Permanent shocks. If costs are permanent, then ¯ πi = π1; that is, period two’s
expected cost is identical to period one’s realized cost.25
• Persistent shocks. Persistence in the cost process implies that a low cost ﬁrm in
period one is more likely to have a low cost in period two, relative to a high cost ﬁrm
in period one, or ¯ πL < ¯ πH.
• Productivity shocks. Suppose costs are a fraction of GDP (y), so that c(q) = ˆ c(q)y,
where y = πk is subject to a productivity shock that follows a discrete Markov process.
Suppose further the transition matrix is:
Π =

 γ 1 − γ
1 − β β

. (6.15)
Then if we assume π0 = πL, productivity shocks ﬁt our framework with ¯ πL = ¯ π and
¯ πH = (1 − β)πL + βπH.
• Multiplicative shocks. Let ¯ πi = βiχiπi + (1 − βi)πi, then with probability β the
ﬁrm experiences a multiplicative marginal cost shock χ. This may be the result of
an uncertain innovation, etc. If the shock represents the discovery of a cost reducing
innovation, because of learning by doing for example, then it is natural to think that
the probability and size of the innovations depend signiﬁcantly on the ﬁrms current
technology/type.
Optimal regulation given no information may now be diﬀerent in period two. Let ¯ q1 = ¯ q
be the no information level of regulation in period one, and let ¯ q2 satisfy:
Bq (¯ q2) = E[π2]cq (¯ q2), (6.16)
where E[π2] = γ¯ πL + (1 − γ) ¯ πH is the unconditional expected cost shock in period two.
The expected change in ﬁrm proﬁts from the regulation is now:
wf (q1,q2,π1, ¯ π1) = −π1C (q1) − δ¯ π1C (q2). (6.17)
25Given that only conditional expectations matter, the optimal regulation policy is identical for permanent
shocks and shocks which are only expected not to change.
27The incentive constraints are now:
wf (q1L,q2L,πL, ¯ πL) ≥ wf (q1H,q2H,πL, ¯ πL), (6.18)
wf (q1H,q2H,πH, ¯ πH) ≥ wf (q1L,q2L,πH, ¯ πH), (6.19)
The Lagrangian for the relaxed problem is:
Lr = γ (B (q1L) − πLc(q1L) + δ(B (q2L) − ¯ πLc(q2L)))+ (6.20)
(1 − γ)(B (q1H) − πHc(q1H) + δ (B (q2H) − ¯ πHc(q2H))) + (6.21)
λ(wf (q1L,q2L,πL, ¯ πL) − wf (q1H,q2H,πL, ¯ πL)). (6.22)







which we discuss below.
PROPOSITION 8 Suppose c(q,π) = πc(q) and let ¯ πH > ¯ πL. Then the solution to the
relaxed problem (6.22) solves the original problem subject to (6.18) and (6.19).
Suppose further that the inequality in condition (6.23) is strict. Then the solution to the
problem (6.22) has the following properties:
8.1. γ (1 − γ)
 
¯ πH
¯ πL − 1
 





8.2. q1H < ¯ q1 < q1L.
8.3. q2L < ¯ q2 < q2H.
Conversely, if condition (6.23) holds with equality, then the solution is the no information
solution: q1L = q1H = ¯ q1 and q2L = q2H = ¯ q2.
To understand the intuition of condition (6.23), let us focus on the special case where
δ = 1. The regulator would like to move regulation closer to the ﬁrst best level in the
period where the expected diﬀerence in marginal costs is widest. The regulator will use the
other period to satisfy incentive compatibility. Condition (6.23) states that the growth rate
of πH is less than that of πL. If the inequality in (6.23) is strict, then marginal costs are
28wider in the ﬁrst period,26 and the mechanism is qualitatively unchanged from the previous
sections. If (6.23) holds with equality, then the diﬀerence in marginal costs is identical in
the ﬁrst and second period. In this case, moving regulation toward ﬁrst best in one period
requires an equal move away from ﬁrst best in the other period. Thus in this special case the
regulator does not gain from varying the regulation over time, and uses the no information
level of regulation.27 Finally, if (6.23) does not hold, then the timing of the mechanism would
reverse: the regulator would move regulation towards ﬁrst best in period two, and use period
one to satisfy incentive compatibility. Therefore, the mechanism (or its reverse) applies for
all but the knife edge case of identical expected growth rates.
The above intuition suggests that it is possible to achieve the ﬁrst best allocation if
¯ πH < ¯ πL. If ¯ πH is less than ¯ πL then under the ﬁrst-best mechanism a ﬁrm reporting L is
regulated strongly in period one, but receives weak regulation in period two and the reverse
timing for a ﬁrm reporting H. In this case, a low-cost ﬁrm’s incentive to exaggerate its
cost is mitigated. By lying it reduces its regulation in the ﬁrst period, when its compliance
cost is low, but increases it in the second period, when its cost is high. In this case the
beneﬁt of lying is small while the cost of lying is large. If this eﬀect is suﬃciently strong, the
ﬁrst-best mechanism may be incentive compatible.28 In order to ensure that the ﬁrst-best
mechanism violates incentive compatibility, we focus on the case of ¯ πH ≥ ¯ πL. Here, the ﬁrm
with lower cost in period one also expects a lower cost in period two and, under the ﬁrst-best
mechanism, would face higher regulation in both periods.
We can get an idea about how the expected growth rates of the cost shocks aﬀects welfare
and the optimal policy by looking at the quadratic example for this case. Let ρL = ¯ πL/πL,
then resolving the model of section 2.4 with the more general shocks yields the solution:


























26Note that the theorem also requires ¯ πH > ¯ πL. If the growth rate of πH is very negative, the diﬀerence
in marginal costs can be wider in the second period even if (6.23) holds.
27Since costs are convex, the regulator prefers a constant level of regulation over time relative to regulation
that is varied by equal amounts in each period.
28This eﬀect can be observed in the proposition. If ¯ πH < ¯ πL then λL can be negative, which allows for a
zero Lagrange multiplier on the incentive constraint.






























































As shown in Proposition 8, the solution reduces to the no information case if the growth
rates are identical, and reduces to the solution of section 2.4 if ¯ πH = ¯ πL = ¯ π. Further, the
solution is analogous to that of section (2.4), with ∆π being replaced by the diﬀerence in
growth rates. The welfare gains are convex in the diﬀerence in growth rates between πH and
πL, as the regulator gains more by diﬀerentially regulating in the ﬁrst period if the ﬁrst best
regulation levels are very far apart.
7 Conclusions
We have shown, in an environment where marginal compliance costs are subject to random
shocks, that the regulator can induce ﬁrms to reveal their costs shocks and increase welfare
by varying the strength of regulation over time. In particular, the optimal mechanism is
to oﬀer the ﬁrm two regulation choices. The ﬁrst starts out weak and becomes stronger,
while the second does the opposite. Firms currently facing high cost shocks know their costs
are likely to decline over time, and chose regulation which is initially weak. Firms with low
cost shocks choose the opposite. In this way, ﬁrms reveal their cost shocks to the regulator.
Welfare improves both because ﬁrms choose strict regulation only when marginal costs are
low, and because doing so reveals information to the regulator.
To implement our mechanism in practice, the regulator could combine a default regulation
that becomes more stringent over time (as is the case for most regulations), with a program
whereby ﬁrms exceeding the regulation standard in the current period receive waivers or
credits for use in the future. Such waiver and credit programs are common. For example, a
provision of the corporate average fuel economy standards allows companies exceeding the
fuel economy standard in the current period to receive credits which allow the companies to
30be below the standard in the future. Low cost ﬁrms take advantage of the credit program,
in order to better equalize marginal costs over time. High cost ﬁrms do not, delaying costly
regulation as costs are expected to fall. Our mechanism diﬀers from existing waiver/credit
programs in that the waiver program must be implemented so as to reveal information.
The regulator must set the appropriate intertemporal price (the rate at which exceeding the
current standard is exchanged for future credits), which trades oﬀ the beneﬁts of equalizing
marginal costs with higher average regulation.
Our mechanism is robust to a number of extensions. If the regulator may make payments
to the ﬁrm, then for any positive cost of funds, the optimal mechanism varies regulation over
time to some degree. Further, if the cost of funds is high enough, the optimal mechanism
does not use payments, but instead relies exclusively on the timing of regulation. In general,
varying regulation over time is more eﬀective than payments when the probability of receiving
a low cost shock is small. If costs are expected to decline over time, the regulator simply
varies regulation strength relative to the trend in regulation over time.
Our mechanism comes with several caveats. First, our mechanism essentially trades oﬀ
current for future distortions, and thus cannot achieve ﬁrst best. Using payments results in
the ﬁrst best allocation, but only under the assumption that no cost of funds exists (that is,
that lump sum taxes are available).
Second, our mechanism relies on commitment. The regulator has an incentive to renege
on promised regulation in the second period, and revert to the optimal level of regulation
given no cost shock information. Nonetheless, the incentive to renege here is more mild than
in models where ﬁrm types do not change over time, since the regulator only desires to return
to the no-information level of regulation, not the optimal regulation given the ﬁrm has a low
cost shock (that is, no “ratchet eﬀect” exists). For the example of the 1990 amendment to
the Clean Air Act, the EPA oﬀered ﬁrms bonus permits in the future for installing scrubbers.
The EPA kept the commitment and allocated the bonus permits, despite speciﬁc clauses in
the law stating that the EPA could revoke any part of the permit system at any time.
Third, the mechanism breaks down if shocks have identical expected growth rates across
time, for example if marginal costs were constant over time. The mechanism relies on
diﬀerentiating regulation in the period where marginal costs are most diﬀerent, and satisfying
incentive compatibility in the period where marginal costs are most similar. A deeper issue
arises, however, here and in some of the literature which takes cost heterogeneity across
ﬁrms as constant. In the long run only ﬁrms with the lowest cost technologies survive
in a competitive market. Thus it is not clear that shocks which are constant over time
31are consistent with a long run competitive equilibrium.29 In contrast, diﬀerential expected
growth rates has natural interpretations. For example, the more regulated ﬁrm could see a
more negative expected growth rate in costs since as it adapts to more stringent regulation.30.
A number of further extensions are possible, but are unlikely to change the main results.
The most interesting extension is to make the number of periods inﬁnite. In this case, our
hypothesis is that the regulator would start with some promised level of total future proﬁts
generated from past reports, and then oﬀer a promise of future proﬁts that are either higher
or lower depending on the ﬁrm’s report. Still, an inﬁnite horizon version of the model may
be less realistic than our two period model, since commitment into the inﬁnite future implies
the regulator will never be replaced.
Despite these caveats, a robust result is that our timing mechanism improves regulatory
eﬃciency. In recent years the public’s appetite for increased regulation has grown. Regula-
tions are becoming increasingly complex, with compliance costs that are increasingly diﬃcult
to forecast, for both ﬁrms and regulators. Therefore, it is clear that more eﬃcient regulations
is an important policy goal, and will only become more so in the future.
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348 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let X ≡ δ(E[C (q2L,π)] − E[C (q2H,π)]). Then the solution to the problem (2.6) satisﬁes:
C (q1H,πL) − C (q1L,πL) = X. (8.1)
Thus, condition (2.5) holds if and only if:
X ≥ C (q1H,πH) − C (q1L,πH). (8.2)
Combining equations (8.1) and (8.2), condition (2.5) holds if and only if:
C (q1H,πL) − C (q1L,πL) ≥ C (q1H,πH) − C (q1L,πH), (8.3)
Next, let a = [q1H,πH] and b = [q1L,πL], then since q1L > q1H (see Proposition 2) and
πH > πL:
C (a ∧ b) − C (b) ≥ C (a) − C (a ∨ b). (8.4)
Condition (8.4) holds if and only if C is supermodular.
8.2 Proof of Proposition 2




L) = Cq (q
∗
L,πL). (8.5)
Given B is concave and C is convex, q1L < q∗
L if and only if:








> Cq (q1L,πL). (8.7)
Equation (8.7) holds since λ > 0. We prove ¯ q < q1L in 2.3 below.




H) = Cq (q
∗
H,πH). (8.8)
Given B is concave and C is convex, q1H > q∗
H if and only if:










< Cq (q1L,πH). (8.10)
Equation (8.10) holds since λ > 0. We prove q1H < ¯ q in 2.3 below.
2.3. For the second period regulations, by deﬁnition:
Bq (¯ q) = E[Cq (¯ q,π)]. (8.11)
Since B is concave and C is convex, q2L < ¯ q if and only if:
Bq (q2L) > E[Cq (q2L,π)]. (8.12)
Equation (2.9) implies the above inequality holds since λ > 0. Similarly, q2H > ¯ q if
and only if:
Bq (q2H) < E[Cq (q2H,π)]. (8.13)
Equation (2.10) implies the above inequality holds since λ > 0.
For q1H < ¯ q, we ﬁrst show that q1L > q1H. To see this, we suppose not. Suppose




C (q1H,πL) − C (q1LπL) + δE[C (q2H,π)] − δE[C (q2L,π)]
 
= 0. (8.14)
36We have shown q2H > q2L, which along with q1H ≥ q1L implies the second term in
(8.14) is positive and thus that λ = 0. But from the ﬁrst order conditions, λ = 0
implies q2L = q∗
L which contradicts q2L < q2H, for example. Thus q1H < q1L.
With q2L < q2H in hand, to show q1H < ¯ q, we suppose not and then construct a
regulation set which is feasible and provides higher welfare, thus contradicting that
q1H ≥ ¯ q is an optimum. Suppose {q1L,q1H,q2L,q2H} is optimal with q1H ≥ ¯ q. Consider
an alternative policy {q1L − ǫ,q1H − ǫ,q2L,q2H}, with ǫ > 0 suﬃciently small (i.e. small
enough to make a ﬁrst order approximation of B and C accurate enough so as to not
change the signs of any of the inequalities). The alternative policy is feasible if and
only if:
C (q1H − ǫ,πL) − C (q1L − ǫ,πL) ≥ X = C (q1H,πL) − C (q1L,πL). (8.15)
Approximating C (q1L − ǫ,πL) around q1L and C (q1H − ǫ,πL) around q1H, implies for
ǫ small the inequality reduces to:
Cq (q1H,πL)(−ǫ) − Cq (q1L,πL)(−ǫ) ≥ 0, (8.16)
Cq (q1L,πL) ≥ Cq (q1H,πL). (8.17)
Equation (8.17) holds since q1L > q1H. Thus the alternative policy is feasible.
We next compare the welfare of the alternative policy with the optimal policy. Since
the second period policies are identical, the alternative policy generates higher welfare
if and only if:
γ
 
B (q1L − ǫ) − C (q1L − ǫ,πL)
 
+ (1 − γ)
 





B (q1L) − C (q1L,πL)
 
+ (1 − γ)
 
B (q1H) − C (q1H,πH)
 
. (8.18)
Performing ﬁrst order approximations reduces the inequality to:
γ
 
Bq (q1L) − Cq (q1L,πL)
 
+ (1 − γ)
 
Bq (q1H) − Cq (q1H,πH)
 
< 0. (8.19)
37Next, since we assumed q1H ≥ ¯ q, and B is concave and C is convex:
Bq (q1H) − Cq (q1H,πH) ≤ Bq (¯ q) − Cq (¯ q,πH). (8.20)
Further, since q1L > q1H ≥ ¯ q,
Bq (q1L) − Cq (q1L,πL) < Bq (¯ q) − Cq (¯ q,πL). (8.21)
We multiply (8.20) by 1 − γ and (8.21) by γ, and sum the two resulting equations.
Comparing the result with (8.19), it is suﬃcient to show:
γ
 
Bq (¯ q) − Cq (¯ q,πL)
 
+ (1 − γ)  
 
Bq (¯ q) − Cq (¯ q,πH)
 
≤ 0, (8.22)
Bq (¯ q) − E[Cq (¯ q,πL)] = 0 ≤ 0. (8.23)
Thus we have a contradiction that {q1L,q1H,q2L,q2H} is optimal as the alternative
policy is feasible and generates higher welfare.























R > γ + (1 − γ)R, (8.26)
λ < γ (1 − γ)(R − 1). (8.27)



















> γ + (1 − γ)R, (8.30)
λ < γ (1 − γ)(R − 1). (8.31)
The above equation is identical to (8.27). Therefore q1L > ¯ q.
2.4. To see that λ < 1 − γ, suppose not, suppose {q1L,q1H,q2L,q2H} is an optimum with
λ ≥ (1 − γ). Then from condition (2.10), we have a corner solution of q2H = 0 since
for all q2H ≥ 0,







which violates the ﬁrst order condition (2.10).
Next, the incentive constraint (2.4) with q2H = 0 implies:
C (q1H,πL) − C (q1L,πL) ≥ E[C (q2L,π)]. (8.33)
Thus q1H ≥ q1L is required for incentive compatibility, with equality if and only if
q2L = 0.
Further, combining the two incentive constraints yields (8.3):
C (q1H,πL) − C (q1L,πL) ≥ C (q1H,πH) − C (q1L,πH). (8.34)
39Let a = [q1H,πL] and b = [q1L,πH], then since πH > πL, if q1L < q1H:
C (a) − C (a ∧ b) > C (a ∨ b) − C (b), (8.35)
which contradicts that C is super modular. Thus we have a contradiction unless
q1H = q1L and q2H = q2L = 0. In this case, the ﬁrm is unregulated in the second
period, regardless of type.
Consider now an alternative policy with identical ﬁrst period policies of q1L = q1H,
but positive regulation of q2j = q∗
H for all j = L,H in the second period. From (2.4)
and (2.5), such a policy is clearly incentive compatible. We also have q∗
H > 0 since
Bq (0) > Cq (0,πH) by assumption and Bq is decreasing and Cq is increasing in q.
No welfare diﬀerence exists in the ﬁrst period. In the second period, the alternative
policy incurs no welfare loss if the ﬁrm is the high cost type, so the alternative policy
generates higher welfare than the unregulated economy if the ﬁrm is the high cost
type. If the ﬁrm is the low cost type, then the diﬀerence in welfare loss between the















(Bq (q) − Cq (q,πL))dq. (8.37)
Note that the function being integrated in (8.37) is positive over the domain of in-
tegration, since Bq (q∗
H) = Cq (q∗
H,πL), Bq is decreasing, and Cq is increasing. Thus
the integral is positive, the diﬀerence in welfare losses is negative, and the alternative
policy gives higher welfare regardless of ﬁrm type. Thus no regulation in the second
period cannot be an optimum. Thus we have a contradiction and so λ < 1 − γ.
8.3 First Order Conditions With a Cost of Funds and Proof of Proposition 3
The ﬁrst order conditions for problem (3.7) are:
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, (8.42)
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, (8.45)
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 ijtij = 0, i,j = L,H. (8.48)
Imposing the solution q1L = q1LL = q1HL = q∗
L and q1H = q2LH = q2HH = q∗
H on (8.38)-
(8.43), we see that the solution satisﬁes the ﬁrst order conditions (8.38)-(8.43) if and only
if λL = λLL = λLH = 0. Imposing this and φ = 0 on (8.44)-(8.48), we see that the solution
satisﬁes the ﬁrst order conditions (8.44)-(8.48) if and only if  ij = 0 for all i,j.
We next show a set of positive payments exists that satisﬁes all constraints. First, let
41tHH = 0, then constraint (3.8), i = H, is satisﬁed for:
tHL = ∆CL ≡ C (q
∗
L,πL) − C (q
∗
H,πL) > 0. (8.49)
Next, we let tLH =
∆CL
δ and tLL = 1+δ
δ ∆CL. Substituting these conditions and q2LL = q∗
L and
q2LH = q∗
H into (3.8), i = L, implies constraint (3.8) is satisﬁed with equality. Substituting
the proposed solution for tLH and tLL and the ﬁrst best solutions for all q’s into (3.10) implies
(3.10) holds with equality.
Finally, substituting the proposed solution for all tij and the ﬁrst best solution for all
q’s into (3.9), i = L,H and (3.11), we see that all three constraints hold if and only if C
is super modular, which holds by assumption. Therefore, since all payments are positive
and all constraints and ﬁrst order conditions are satisﬁed, the ﬁrst best level of regulation is
optimal for φ = 0.
8.4 Proof of Proposition 4
We must show the solution to (2.7)-(2.11) with tij = 0 for all i,j satisﬁes all ﬁrst order
conditions and constraints for (3.7). Comparing (2.7) and (8.38), we see that (8.38) is
satisﬁed if and only if λL = λ, where λ is the multiplier for problem (2.6). Condition (2.8)
implies condition (8.39) is also satisﬁed for λL = λ.































Using the deﬁnition of R:
























So if (8.53) holds, condition (8.40) is satisﬁed. Further, imposing q2LH = q2L on (8.41) and
42using (2.9) to eliminate the marginal beneﬁt function, we see that (8.41) holds if and only if
(8.53) holds.























γ (1 − γ)
. (8.55)
Finally, using the deﬁnition of R:











γ (1 − γ)
, (8.56)
λLH = γ (1 − γ)







So condition (8.42) is satisﬁed if and only if (8.57) holds. Further, an analogous argument
shows that (8.43) holds if and only if (8.57) holds.
Next, our solution requires all payments to be zero, and thus all of the multipliers  ij to
be positive. From (8.44) given λL = λ, this requires:
 LL





γ2 > 0. (8.58)











φ > (1 − γ)(R − 1) +
λ
γ
(γ + (1 − γ)R). (8.60)
So for φ suﬃciently big, tLL = 0 as required, with  LL deﬁned by substituting (8.53) and
λL = λ into (8.44). Recall λ is the multiplier from problem (2.6), and thus is independent
of φ, so a φ suﬃciently large always exists.
43For tLH, (8.45) requires:
 LH






γ (1 − γ)
> 0, (8.61)











So for φ satisfying (8.62), tLH = 0 as required, with  LH deﬁned by substituting (8.53) and
λL = λ into (8.45).
Condition (8.60) is more restrictive than condition (8.62) if and only if:
(1 − γ)(R − 1) +
λ
γ
(γ + (1 − γ)R) >
λ
γ















which holds since R > 1.
For tHL, (8.46) requires:
 HL






γ (1 − γ)
> 0. (8.65)
Substituting in (8.57) and simplifying gives:










Given (8.66), tHL = 0 and  HL is deﬁned by substituting (8.57) into (8.46). Clearly (8.66)
is less restrictive than (8.60).
Finally, note that for tHH, the multiplier is always positive and so tHH = 0, with the
multiplier deﬁned by (8.47) and (8.57).
Therefore, given (8.60), the proposed solution satisﬁes the ﬁrst order conditions. Clearly,
for C supermodular, the solution satisﬁes the ﬁrst period incentive compatibility constraints,
which are identical to the incentive compatibility constraints from the problem without
payments. The second period incentive compatibility constraints are also satisﬁed since
payments are zero and q2LH = q2LL = q2L and q2HL = q2HH = q2H. Therefore the proposed
44solution satisﬁes all constraints and ﬁrst order conditions given (8.60).
Finally, we can bound (8.60) using Proposition 2.3. Since λ < 1−γ, a suﬃcient condition
for (8.60) is:
φ > (1 − γ)(R − 1) +
1 − γ
γ
(γ + (1 − γ)R). (8.67)





which is the desired result.
8.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Suppose not, suppose that q1H = q2LH = q2HH and φ > 0. Then since the cost function is
































Since λL and λLH are non-negative and R > 1, the above equation is satisﬁed if and only if






















Since λL = 0, we must have λLL = 0. Thus, q1H = q2LH = q2HH implies all incentive
45constraints are non-binding. The ﬁrst order conditions (8.38)-(8.43) then imply the regulator
achieves the ﬁrst best allocation q1L = q2HL = q2LL = q∗
L and q1H = q2LH = q2HH = q∗
H.
Plugging in the ﬁrst best decisions for all i,j into for example, the incentive constraint
(3.8), i = L, implies:
tLL − C (q
∗
L,πL) ≥ tLH − C (q
∗
H,πL), (8.74)
which implies tLL > tLH ≥ 0 since q∗
L > q∗
H.
Next, plugging in λL = λLL = λLH = 0 into (8.44) and evaluating (8.48) at LL gives:
 LL = γ
2φ, (8.75)
 LLtLL = 0. (8.76)
The above two equations are satisﬁed only if φ = 0 since tLL > 0, which contradicts φ > 0.
Thus q1H = q2LH = q2HH cannot hold for φ > 0.
8.6 Proof of Proposition 6














Since Cq is an increasing function, it is immediate that q2L,m < q2H,m.














Bq (mq2L,m + (n − m)q2H,m)
> 1. (8.79)
46Therefore, it is suﬃcient to show:
Bq (nq2L,m) > Bq (mq2L,m + (n − m)q2H,m), (8.80)
which holds if and only if:
nq2L,m > mq2L,m + (n − m)q2H,m, (8.81)
q2H,m > q2L,m, (8.82)
which holds as shown above. Thus, q2L,m < ¯ qn.














Bq (mq2L,m + (n − m)q2H,m)
< 1. (8.84)
Therefore, it is suﬃcient to show:
Bq (nq2H,m) < Bq (mq2L,m + (n − m)q2H,m), (8.85)
nq2H,m < mq2L,m + (n − m)q2H,m, (8.86)
q2L,m < q2H,m, (8.87)
which holds as shown above. Thus, q2L,m < ¯ qn.
6.1. For the ﬁrst period policies, we begin by showing q1H,m < q1L,m, which requires several
47steps. The ﬁrst step is to show that the sign of q1L,m − q1H,m does not vary with m.




































Since C is convex, q1L,m − q1H,m > 0 if and only if the right hand side of (8.90) is
greater than one or if and only if:
λ < γ (1 − γ)(R − 1). (8.91)
Since (8.91) is independent of m, the sign of q1L,m − q1H,m is independent of m.
The next step is to show q1i (m,λ), i = L,H is an increasing function of m if and only






Bqq   (q1L,m − q1H,m)




















Here we have suppressed the function arguments for Bqq. Hence both derivatives are
positive if and only if q1L,m > q1H,m.
Finally, to prove q1L,m > q1H,m we suppose not, so that q1L,m ≤ q1H,m. If so, then step
one implies the inequality holds for all m and step two implies both derivatives are





C (q1H,m−1,πL) − C (q1L,m,πL) − δE[C (q2H,m−1,π) − C (q2L,m,π)]
 
≥ 0,





(C (q1H,m−1,πL) − C (q1H,m,πL)) + (C (q1H,m,πL) − C (q1L,m,πL))





(C (q1L,n−1,πL) − C (q1L,n,πL)) + (C (q1H,n−1,πL) − C (q1L,n−1,πL))+
δE[(C (q2L,n−1,π) − C (q2L,n,π)) + (C (q2H,n−1,π) − C (q2L,n−1,π))]
 
> 0. (8.93)
Notice that the second term in rows one and three are non-negative, since we have
supposed q1L,m ≤ q1H,m, which, if true holds for all m. The second terms in rows two
and four are strictly positive, since we have shown q2L,m < q2H,m. The ﬁrst term in each
row is non-negative since q1L,m and q1H,m are non-increasing in m, given q1L,m ≤ q1H,m.
Thus the incentive constraint is strictly positive.
However, the Kuhn-Tucker condition then implies λ = 0. Then, from the ﬁrst order
conditions (4.7) and (4.10), the ﬁrst best solution results: q1L,m = q∗
Lm > q1H,m = q∗
Hm,
which contradicts that q1L,m ≤ q1H,m. Thus q1L,m > q1H,m.
With this result in hand, we now show that q1L,m > ¯ qn. First, multiplying the ﬁrst
order conditions (4.7) and (4.10) by γ and 1−γ, respectively, and using the deﬁnition
of R gives:
γBq (mq1L,m + (n − m)q1H,m) = (γ + λ)Cq (q1L,m,πL), (8.94)
(1 − γ)Bq (mq1L,m + (n − m)q1H,m) = (R(1 − γ) − λ)Cq (q1H,m,πL). (8.95)
49Since q1L,m > q1H,m:
(1 − γ)Bq (mq1L,m + (n − m)q1H,m) < (R(1 − γ) − λ)Cq (q1L,m,πL). (8.96)
Adding equations (8.94) and (8.96) gives:
Bq (mq1L,m + (n − m)q1H,m) < (γ + R(1 − γ))Cq (q1L,m,πL) = E[Cq (q1L,m,π)]. (8.97)
Here the last equality follows from the deﬁnition of R. Now since q1L,m < q1H,m:
Bq (nq1L,m) < Bq (mq1L,m + (n − m)q1H,m) < E[Cq (q1L,m,π)]. (8.98)







Since the right and left hand sides are decreasing functions, q1L,m > ¯ qn as desired.
The proof that q1H,m < ¯ qn follows an identical logic.
6.3. That q1L,m and q1H,m are increasing functions of m follows immediately from q1L,m >
q1H,m and (8.92).
8.7 Proof of Proposition 7
Starting with the second claim, ﬁrst note that for the second order conditions for the regu-
lator’s problem to hold, a necessary condition is that the derivative of equation (5.10) with
respect to q2L is negative:
































50Substituting (8.101) and the ﬁrm ﬁrst order condition (5.2) into (8.100) and simplifying
gives:






















E[Cq (¯ qζ,π,ζ (¯ qζ))]. (8.103)
From the deﬁnition of ¯ qζ and (5.11):






E[Cq (¯ qζ,π,ζ (¯ qζ))], (8.104)
which holds since λ > 0.














E[Cq (¯ qζ,π,ζ (¯ qζ))]. (8.105)
Using the deﬁnition of ¯ qζ and equation (5.12):






E[Cq (¯ qζ,π,ζ (¯ qζ))], (8.106)
which holds since λ > 0.
For the ﬁrst claim, we ﬁrst show that q1L > q1H. The incentive constraint (5.13) implies:
C (q1H,πL,0) − C (q1L,πL,0) =
δ (E[C (q2L,π,ζL)] + PζζL − E[C (q2H,π,ζH)] − PζζH). (8.107)
A ﬁrst order Taylor expansion of E[C (q2L,π,ζ (q2L))] + Pζζ (q2L) around q2H implies the
right and side is approximately:
r.h.s ≈ δ(E[Cq (q2H,π,ζH)] + (E[Cζ (q2H,π,ζH)] + Pζ)ζq (q2H))(q2L − q2H), (8.108)
= δE[Cq (q2H,π,ζH)](q2L − q2H) < 0. (8.109)
51Here the last equality uses the ﬁrm ﬁrst order condition (5.2). Since the right hand side is
negative, equation (8.107) implies q1L > q1H.
Given q1L > q1H, the proof that q1H < ¯ q < q1L is identical to the proof of proposition
(2). The proof of proposition (2) given q1H < ¯ q < q1L depends only on equations (2.7) and
(2.8). In turn, these equations are identical to equations (5.8) and (5.9). Hence the proof is
identical and q1H < ¯ q < q1L.
8.8 Proof of Proposition 8
We ﬁrst show that upward incentive compatibility (6.19) is always satisﬁed if constraint
(6.18) is satisﬁed with equality and the level of regulation in period one is monotonic non-







Hence given q1L ≥ q1H:
¯ πH
¯ πL
πL (c(q1L) − c(q1H)) ≤ πH (c(q1L) − c(q1H)). (8.111)
Next, since (6.18) holds with equality:
πL (c(q1L) − c(q1H)) = δ¯ πL (c(q2H) − c(q2L)). (8.112)
Substituting (8.112) into (8.111) gives:
¯ πH
¯ πL
δ¯ πL (c(q2H) − c(q2L)) ≤ πH (c(q1L) − c(q1H)), (8.113)
δ¯ πH (c(q2H) − c(q2L)) ≤ πH (c(q1L) − c(q1H)), (8.114)
−πHc(q1L) − δ¯ πHc(q2L) ≤ −πHc(q1H) − δ¯ πHc(q2H), (8.115)
which is just (6.19). Provided the solution to a relaxed problem which ignores constraint
(6.19) satisﬁes q1L ≥ q1H, it also solves the original problem.
The ﬁrst order conditions for the relaxed problem are:
































πL (c(q1L) − c(q1H)) = δ¯ πL (c(q2H) − c(q2L)). (8.120)
Deﬁne λL = γ (1 − γ)
 
¯ πH
¯ πL − 1
 






λ < (=)λR ⇔ q1L > (=)q1H, (8.121)






⇔ λL < (=)λR. (8.123)
Consider ﬁrst the case in which condition (8.123) holds with equality. Consider the
solution λ = λL = λR. Equations (8.121) and (8.122) imply that q1L = q1H and q2L = q2H
satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions. Therefore the incentive constraints (6.18) and (6.19) are
satisﬁed. Plugging in the solution for λ into any of the ﬁrst period ﬁrst order conditions, we
see that q1L = q1H = ¯ q1. Further, plugging in the solution for λ into either of the second
period ﬁrst order conditions implies q2L = q2H = ¯ q2. Therefore, the regulator oﬀers the no
information regulation level to both types in both periods.
Next, consider the case where the inequality in (8.123) is strict. Consider λ = λL < λR.
Since q2H = q2L, the incentive constraint (6.18) is satisﬁed if and only if q1H ≥ q1L, but this
contradicts (8.121) since λ < λR.
Conversely, consider λ = λR > λL. Since q1H = q1L, the incentive constraint (6.18) is
satisﬁed if and only if q2H ≥ q2L, which holds by (8.122) since λ > λL.
Therefore, the incentive constraint is slack at λ = λR, and is violated at λ = λL. By
the intermediate value theorem, there exists λ∗ ∈ (λL,λR) for which the incentive constraint
(6.18) holds with equality. From (8.121)-(8.122), at λ∗, q1L > q1H and q2H > q2L. Therefore
53the solution to the relaxed problem solves the original problem.














< ¯ π. (8.125)
Using the deﬁnition of ¯ π, we have:
λ
γ
πL < (1 − γ)(πH − πL), (8.126)






which holds by (8.121).













> E[π2] = γ¯ πL + (1 − γ) ¯ πH, (8.129)






which holds by (8.122).
Analogous arguments show that q1H < ¯ q1 and q2H > ¯ q2.
54